Which VCs are investing in robotics? Here is the list.

the instrument of venture investment

source: SEC.gov

My overview of the Firms Behind the Hizook 2011 VC in Robotic List has graciously been published at Hizook.

Bottom line:  We don’t have a cadre of dedicated robotics investors, but we can get investment from the industries that serve as our customers.

I wish you all luck in getting some of that VC Cash.  …on second thought, no, actually, I don’t–I  wish you all luck in signing up major partners who will give you progress payments to complete your product without diluting your investment.

But whatever your situation I hope that you use the appropriate capital structure to make lots of robots, lots money, and lots of good in the world.

Robotics capital intensive?! What are you smoking? Don’t believe it.

Robotic manufacturing is not capital intensive, contrary to the popular wisdom.  (Looking at you HBS.)

Unless someone can bring data to the contrary, we should treat this issue as thoroughly decided against the  conventional wisdom.  As we saw previously, robotics companies do not need a lot of fixed assets.  Now, we will see why people who blithely repeat the conventional wisdom that robotics companies are capital intensive are wrong–even if they claim robotics companies are hiding their true use of capital.

First off, robotics companies’ balance sheets look like technology companies’–the internet kind, not the aerospace/industrial kind.  Robotics companies have lots of cash and relatively little else.

Second, robotics companies have gross margins that even companies that don’t make stuff would envy.  The robotics gross margin would probably be even higher if iRobot and Aerovironment were not defense contractors.   There is a lot of pressure to bury as much expense as allowed into the cost of goods due to defense contract rules.   Intuitive and Cognex’s margins are around 75%.  They are even beating Google on gross margin!

Although, it does appear that robotics companies have a bit longer cash conversion cycle than the basket chosen for comparison here, their cash cycle appears to be in line with other complex manufacturers.  Plus, the robotics companies are holding so much cash their management may just not really care to push the conversion cycle down.

Look at the cash required to sell aircraft though!  Manned or unmanned it looks like it takes forever to get paid for making planes.

Although robotics companies have physical products, the value of a robot is in the knowledge and information used to create it and operate it.  The materials are nothing special.  Consequently, these companies look like part of the knowledge economy–few real assets, lots of cash, and huge attention to their workforce.   Next time someone tells you robotics companies are capital intensive, ask them to share what they’re smoking–it’s probably the good stuff–because they aren’t using data.

One thing that a venture capitalist may mean when he says that robotics is capital intensive is that it generally takes a long time and lots of money to develop a viable product in robotics.  This may be true, but it is not really the same thing as being capital intensive.   This observation should cause a lot of soul-searching within our industry.  What the venture capitalist is telling us is that we–as an industry–cannot reliably manage our engineering, product development, and business structures to produce financial results.

This is why the conventional wisdom is dangerous.  It suggests that the lack of investors, money, and talent flowing into our industry isn’t our fault and there’s not much we can do about it.  That is what needs to change in robotics.  We need to get better at management.  We need to start building companies quicker and producing returns for our investors.  If we do that the money, talent, and creativity will start pouring into industry.  Then robotics can change the world.

Notes on Data and Method
Data Source: Last 10-k

Method:

Accounts Receivable = All balance sheet accounts that seem to be related to a past sale and future cash, so accounts receivable plus things like LinkedIn’s deferred commissions.

Cash + Investments = All balance sheets I could identify as being financial investments not required to operate.   Assume all companies require zero cash to operate.

Did not account for advances in cash conversion cycle.

U.S. Robotic Stocks: Speculators Wanted (the real kind, not the financial kind)

The first part of the robotic stock tracker is up.  The index is coming!

First observation:  It is amazing how volatile robotic stocks are and how much idiosyncratic behavior each stock has exhibited since the start of the year.   With this much volatility, one would expect robotic stocks to produce market beating performance over the long run, but they certainly haven’t done it so far this year.  In the short run, it is very difficult to value real assets that have uncertain financial prospects.  In the long run, I’m banking on an extremely bright future, powered by robots.

Hizook 2011 Notes

Be on the look out for a forthcoming analysis of the Hizook 2011 VC in Robotic List on Hizook about the funds that invest in robotics.   I’m publishing my research notes here so they don’t foul up the article.  Most of this was sourced from company websites, CrunchBase, local media, or whatever I could find using Google with my limited attention span, I think I even remembered to cite a few as I was making this.

The only thing I’d really like to call your attention to, dear reader, is the complete lack of transparency in the private markets.  You’ll see that there are places I could find a round, or an amount, or fund but nothing else.  A lot of the poor citation is me trying to find a better source.  Private transactions have no organized data so if this can be the faintest candle for finding funding for robotics, then I’ve done my job.

As always, I’d love feedback.  I’m hungry for data!

What cluster does a company with HQ in Boston but more offices in Silicon Valley belong to?

I’ve got more comprehensive data on public robotics companies due to some updates suggested over at hizook.  However, I’m at a loss as to how to classify Brooks Automation and Cognex.  They both make automation components for various kinds of industrial applications and they both have corporate HQ outside of Boston with two offices each (probably the legacy of acquisitions) in Silicon Valley.

At a loss as to how to classify them, I’ve made a new category for them on my charts.  If you have thoughts about how to get good acquisition data–especially as a lot robotics companies can be acquired in a transaction that is ‘immaterial’ to a 10-K/Q for public company–I’d love to hear them.

And here is the raw data.  Not all market caps were taken on the same day.

Surprise! Robotics Companies Are NOT Capital Intensive

Please allow me to blow your mind and overturn the common sense notion that robotics companies are capital intensive.  Comparing profitable, public, U.S. based robotics companies to a diverse basket of prominent public companies shows that robotics companies do not require a lot equipment and property to make successful businesses.

In fact, robotics companies have the least property plant and equipment of any of the companies I selected for comparison–which deliberately included such tech giants as a chip maker, an operating system maker, and a search engine giant.  Looking at capital expenditure and depreciation, the robotics companies are again among the leanest of the companies on the list.

The only companies that had such low numbers for CAPEX and depreciation had their assets tied up in very long term investments like real estate and aircraft manufacturing facilities.  Also, most of the robotics companies are still growing and may have their capital expenditures boosted as a percentage of revenues by their anticipated growth.  Take a look at the trend line.

Now what people may mean when they say that robotics is ‘capital intensive’ is that the marginal cost of goods sold for a robotics company is greater than $0/per unit that consumer web applications have–but if that’s what they mean they should come out and say it and not be sloppy in their reasoning.

Angels, VCs, and other investors are you paying attention?  Big plays are going to be made on relatively small bets.

As a Percentage of Revenue
Ticker

Company

PPE Depreciation

CAPEX

Robotics

IRBT

iRobot

6.81%

2.42%

3.05%

ISRG

Intuitive Surgical

11.31%

1.68%

6.79%

AVAV

Aerovironment

7.24%

2.76%

4.61%

CGNX

Cognex

9.86%

1.72%

2.43%

Robotics Median

8.55%

2.07%

3.83%

Robotics Average

8.80%

2.14%

4.22%

Diversified

GOOG

Google

25.33%

3.68%

9.07%

MSFT

Microsoft

11.67%

3.95%

3.37%

T

AT&T

84.50%

14.50%

15.87%

INTC

Intel

43.75%

9.52%

19.93%

XOM

ExxonMobil

45.96%

3.34%

6.63%

BA

Boeing

13.55%

2.12%

2.36%

D

Dominion Resources

206.34%

8.96%

25.40%

AA

Alcoa

77.82%

5.94%

5.16%

DIS

Disney

38.99%

4.50%

7.32%

HD

Home Depot

34.54%

2.39%

1.65%

Diversified Median

41.37%

4.23%

6.98%

Diversified Average

58.25%

5.89%

9.68%

Some notes on the analysis:

-Data comes from the companies last 10-K filing.  Some companies include different things in revenue (where possible I tried to exclude revenue from a financing arm), in deprecation (some include amortization of intangible assets), and capital expenditure (Intuitive, for example, includes the acquisition of intangible assets).

-I wanted to look at a diverse basket of public companies and tried to pick companies that might be similar in some ways to robotics companies but whose earnings would not be unduly influenced by robotic related income.  For example, I excluded offshore oil field services companies because they were too close to being robotics companies, but still not pure enough to get a good view of the diversified company.  I did include Disney (which does anamatronics), Boeing (which has a UAV making subsidiary), and Google (which has a robotic car division) because I thought the revenues contributed to the these companies by robotics related activities had no material impact on the financial metrics.  However, their tangential involvement in robotics speaks to their similarity to robotics businesses.

-Future analysis should look at some other places where capital use can be buried.  For example, Cost of Goods Sold can hide capital that is employed on the companies behalf further up the supply chain.  It is possible that current assets like inventory may also need to be higher for robotics companies.  Also, we should compare total assets and liabilities to the revenue generated to similarly sized public companies to see if there is a substantial difference.

East Coast Chauvinism in Robotics: Time to Face Facts, Silicon Valley is Kicking Our Ass

A cleaned-up version of this article became my first post on Hizook.  http://www.hizook.com/blog/2012/06/25/east-coast-chauvinism-robotics-time-face-facts-silicon-valley-kicking-our-butt#comment-971

_______

I have lots of love for Pittsburgh in particular, but it really pisses me off when people on the East Coast repeat a bunch of falsehoods (See #8) about how Boston and Pittsburgh compare to Silicon Valley and the rest of the world.  Many people in Pittsburgh and Boston—including people I call friends and mentors—smugly think that the MIT and CMU centered robotics clusters are leading the world in robotics.  This is demonstrably false.

If leadership in robotics means forming companies, making money, or employing people, then Silicon Valley is crushing everyone—no matter what the Wall Street Journal editorial page says about their business climate.  I’ve previously published an analysis of the Hizook 2011 VC Funding in Robotics data that shows that the Valley gets 49% of total VC robotics investment worldwide.

I’d now like to add an analysis of U.S. public companies (see bottom of the page).  Basically, the ‘Pittsburgh and Boston are the center of the robotics world’ story is even more ridiculous if you look at where public robotics companies are located.  Silicon Valley is crushing the other clusters in the U.S. at creating value in robotics and in building a robotics workforce in public companies.  (A forthcoming analysis will show that this true worldwide and if you include robotics divisions of public companies not principally engaged in robotics such as Boeing and Textron.)

77% of the workforce at public robotics pure plays is in Silicon Valley companies.  An astounding 93% of the market capitalization is headquartered in Silicon Valley and even if you exclude Intuitive Surgical (NASDAQ:ISRG) as an outlier, the Silicon Valley cluster still has twice as much market capitalization as Boston.

The public companies that I deemed to meet the criteria of being principally engaged in robotics, that they had to make and sell a robot, and not have substantial value creating revenues from businesses not related to robotics are listed in the table below.

The one company that I believe might be controversial for being excluded from this list is Cognex (NASDAQ:CGNX).  However, while trying to do decide on whether to include them, I found their list of locations.  They have three locations in California including two in Silicon Valley.  That means that this ‘Boston’ company has more offices in Silicon Valley than in Boston.  I’m not an advanced (or motivated) enough analyst to find out what the exact employee breakdown is, but combined with the fact that they make vision systems and supply components rather than robots, I elected to exclude them. I acknowledge that a similar case could be made about Adept (NASDAQ:ADEP) that just made a New Hampshire acquisition, but I have decided to include them and count them towards Silicon Valley.   I do not believe that either of these decisions, substantively impact my finding that Silicon Valley is the leading cluster when it comes to public company workforce and value creation.

I’m hoping the people who are spreading the misinformation that Silicon Valley has to catch-up to Boston and Pittsburgh will publish corrections.  I believe that this is important, particularly because I want to see Pittsburgh reclaim its early lead in robotics.  So many robotic inventions can trace their heritage back to Pittsburgh, it is a real shame that Pittsburgh has not used this strength to create the kind of robotics business ecosystem that one would hope.

It is impossible for communities to take appropriate action if they do not understand where they stand.  I hope that this new data will inspire the Pittsburgh community to come together and address the challenges of culture, customer access, and capital availability that have been inhibiting the growth of Pittsburgh’s robotic ecosystem before they lose too many more aspiring young entrepreneurs—such as me—to the siren song of California.

Company (1) Ticker Employees (2) Market Cap $M (3) % of Employees % of Market Cap Robotics Cluster
Accuray NASDAQ:ARAY

                   1,100

  463

20%

2%

SV
Adept NASDAQ:ADEP

                       183

43

3%

0%

SV
Aerovironment NASDAQ:AVAV

                       768

  577

14%

2%

SV
Hansen NASDAQ:HNSN

                       174

 135

3%

1%

SV
Intuitive Surgical NASDAQ:ISRG

                   1,924

  21,840

36%

88%

SV
iRobot NASDAQ:IRBT

                       619

  606

12%

2%

BOS
MAKO Surgical NASDAQ:MAKO

                       429

  1,110

8%

4%

Other
Stereotaxis Inc. NASDAQ:STXS

                       171

 13

3%

0%

Other
Total

                   5,368

24,787

100%

100%

(1) Companies are U.S. public companies that have been identified by Frank Tobe’s or my own research as principally engaged in robotics
(2) Employee Count as of Last 10-K Filing
(3) Market Capitalization as of 6/24/2012

Who is investing in robotics

Inspired by getting a second e-mail about Grishin Robotics, I was parsing the VC data from Hizook to see who actually does invest in robotics.  I was surprised to see that there are firms that actually make multiple investments in robotics.

1)  The Foundry Group has invested in both Orbotix and the Makerbot.  This makes some sense in that this is the Techstars crew.  They get consumer technology and nerd culture Makerbot and Orbotix both cater to the maker / gadget-lover / nerd-cool market with consumer products.  Although I’m sure that both companies have possibility of being onto something much bigger whether that is distributed 3D printing changing manufacturing or augmented reality games changing the way that we think about the world, they are both at this point in the toy / hobby market.

2)  Draper Fischer Jurvetson shows up once with Heartland Robotics (now Rethink Robotics) and once again through their ‘Midwest’ affiliate Draper Triangle on Aethon‘s latest raise.  You’ll notice that both of these are practical, safe around humans, commercial applications with predictable, well understood businesses as the customers of these robots.

3) Bezos Expeditions also shows up as an investor on Hizook’s list twice.  He (they?) splits the difference by investing in Makerbot Industries and Heartland/Rethink Robotics.  I guess you could deduce a theme around making stuff, but I think that it might have more to do with personal relationships or just what Jeff Bezos thinks is cool as shit.  I know this post is full of links, but take a look at Bezos Expeditions.  Their portfolio is a space company, a fusion company, a 10,000 year clock with no commercial purpose, and a bunch of other really cool stuff that might scare the bejeezus of a regular VC–along with some relatively conventional investments like Air BnB.

I hope that when Grishin Robotics makes investments, it becomes the kind of investor that signals to follow-on investors that companies it chooses are solid and likely to become profitable.  We need more people entering the business of robotics and investing in robotics if this technology is going to reach everyone it should.   I commend Dmitry Grishin on putting his money where his convictions are.

Better Coverage for Robotic Stocks

Unfortunately we’re still not a big enough industry that we get good news and analyst coverage on important events.  For instance, Hansen Medical (NASDAQ:HNSN) announced FDA approval of their new surgical device yesterday.  Expected perhaps, but still uncertainty reducing good news for the company, the stock should go up.  It does for a few minutes, then the market goes back to hammering them.   For a company of alumni from Intuitive Surgical, what gives?

I understand they are not growing, but it seems like they have the breathing room to perfect their product and growth does not occur linearly in these kinds of companies.  I’d love to see some good information on what the company should be valued at conditional on success and what the current market discount implies about the probability of success.

Check it out on Google finance:

http://www.google.com/finance?chdnp=1&chdd=1&chds=1&chdv=1&chvs=maximized&chdeh=0&chfdeh=0&chdet=1338964260514&chddm=1955&chls=IntervalBasedLine&q=NASDAQ:HNSN&ntsp=0

Q1 2012 Conference Call Transcript:

http://seekingalpha.com/article/553711-hansen-medical-s-ceos-discuss-1q-2012-financial-results-earnings-call-transcript